postmaster children before client auth step. Postmaster now rereads pg_pwd on receipt of SIGHUP, the same way that pg_hba.conf is handled. No cycles need be expended to validate password cache validity during connection startup.
364 lines
7.8 KiB
C
364 lines
7.8 KiB
C
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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* crypt.c
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* Look into the password file and check the encrypted password with
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* the one passed in from the frontend.
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*
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* Original coding by Todd A. Brandys
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*
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
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*
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* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c,v 1.41 2001/11/02 18:39:57 tgl Exp $
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*
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*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
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#include <crypt.h>
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#endif
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#include "libpq/crypt.h"
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#include "libpq/libpq.h"
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#include "miscadmin.h"
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#include "storage/fd.h"
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#include "utils/nabstime.h"
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#define CRYPT_PWD_FILE "pg_pwd"
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static char **pwd_cache = NULL;
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static int pwd_cache_count = 0;
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/*
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* crypt_getpwdfilename --- get full pathname of password file
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*
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* Note that result string is palloc'd, and should be freed by the caller.
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*/
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char *
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crypt_getpwdfilename(void)
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{
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int bufsize;
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char *pfnam;
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bufsize = strlen(DataDir) + 8 + strlen(CRYPT_PWD_FILE) + 1;
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pfnam = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
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snprintf(pfnam, bufsize, "%s/global/%s", DataDir, CRYPT_PWD_FILE);
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return pfnam;
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}
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/*
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* Open the password file if possible (return NULL if not)
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*/
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static FILE *
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crypt_openpwdfile(void)
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{
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char *filename;
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FILE *pwdfile;
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filename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
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pwdfile = AllocateFile(filename, "r");
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if (pwdfile == NULL && errno != ENOENT)
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elog(DEBUG, "could not open %s: %m", filename);
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pfree(filename);
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return pwdfile;
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}
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/*
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* Compare two password-file lines on the basis of their usernames.
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*
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* Can also be used to compare just a username against a password-file
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* line (for bsearch).
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*/
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static int
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compar_user(const void *user_a, const void *user_b)
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{
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char *login_a;
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char *login_b;
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int len_a,
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len_b,
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result;
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login_a = *((char **) user_a);
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login_b = *((char **) user_b);
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/*
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* We only really want to compare the user logins which are first
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* and are terminated by CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR. (NB: this code
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* effectively assumes that CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR is just one char.)
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*/
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len_a = strcspn(login_a, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
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len_b = strcspn(login_b, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
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result = strncmp(login_a, login_b, Min(len_a, len_b));
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if (result == 0) /* one could be a prefix of the other */
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result = (len_a - len_b);
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return result;
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}
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/*
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* Load or reload the password-file cache
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*/
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void
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load_password_cache(void)
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{
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FILE *pwd_file;
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char buffer[1024];
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/*
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* If for some reason we fail to open the password file, preserve the
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* old cache contents; this seems better than dropping the cache if,
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* say, we are temporarily out of filetable slots.
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*/
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if (!(pwd_file = crypt_openpwdfile()))
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return;
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/* free any old data */
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if (pwd_cache)
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{
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while (--pwd_cache_count >= 0)
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pfree(pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count]);
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pfree(pwd_cache);
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pwd_cache = NULL;
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pwd_cache_count = 0;
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}
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/*
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* Read the file and store its lines in current memory context,
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* which we expect will be PostmasterContext. That context will
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* live as long as we need the cache to live, ie, until just after
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* each postmaster child has completed client authentication.
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*/
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while (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), pwd_file) != NULL)
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{
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int blen;
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/*
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* We must remove the return char at the end of the string, as
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* this will affect the correct parsing of the password entry.
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*/
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if (buffer[(blen = strlen(buffer) - 1)] == '\n')
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buffer[blen] = '\0';
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if (pwd_cache == NULL)
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pwd_cache = (char **)
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palloc(sizeof(char *) * (pwd_cache_count + 1));
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else
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pwd_cache = (char **)
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repalloc((void *) pwd_cache,
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sizeof(char *) * (pwd_cache_count + 1));
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pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count++] = pstrdup(buffer);
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}
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FreeFile(pwd_file);
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/*
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* Now sort the entries in the cache for faster searching later.
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*/
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qsort((void *) pwd_cache, pwd_cache_count, sizeof(char *), compar_user);
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}
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/*
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* Parse a line of the password file to extract password and valid-until date.
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*/
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static bool
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crypt_parsepwdentry(char *buffer, char **pwd, char **valdate)
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{
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char *parse = buffer;
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int count,
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i;
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*pwd = NULL;
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*valdate = NULL;
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/*
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* skip to the password field
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
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{
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parse += strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
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if (*parse == '\0')
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return false;
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parse++;
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}
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/*
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* store a copy of user password to return
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*/
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count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
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*pwd = (char *) palloc(count + 1);
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memcpy(*pwd, parse, count);
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(*pwd)[count] = '\0';
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parse += count;
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if (*parse == '\0')
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{
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pfree(*pwd);
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*pwd = NULL;
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return false;
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}
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parse++;
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/*
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* store a copy of the date login becomes invalid
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*/
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count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
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*valdate = (char *) palloc(count + 1);
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memcpy(*valdate, parse, count);
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(*valdate)[count] = '\0';
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return true;
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}
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/*
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* Lookup a username in the password-file cache,
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* return his password and valid-until date.
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*/
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static bool
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crypt_getloginfo(const char *user, char **passwd, char **valuntil)
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{
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*passwd = NULL;
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*valuntil = NULL;
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if (pwd_cache)
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{
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char **pwd_entry;
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pwd_entry = (char **) bsearch((void *) &user,
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(void *) pwd_cache,
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pwd_cache_count,
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sizeof(char *),
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compar_user);
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if (pwd_entry)
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{
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if (crypt_parsepwdentry(*pwd_entry, passwd, valuntil))
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
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int
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md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *user, const char *pgpass)
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{
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char *passwd,
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*valuntil,
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*crypt_pwd;
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int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
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if (!crypt_getloginfo(user, &passwd, &valuntil))
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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if (passwd == NULL || *passwd == '\0')
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{
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if (passwd)
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pfree(passwd);
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if (valuntil)
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pfree(valuntil);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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/* If they encrypt their password, force MD5 */
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if (isMD5(passwd) && port->auth_method != uaMD5)
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{
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snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
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"Password is stored MD5 encrypted. "
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"'password' and 'crypt' auth methods cannot be used.\n");
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fputs(PQerrormsg, stderr);
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pqdebug("%s", PQerrormsg);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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/*
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* Compare with the encrypted or plain password depending on the
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* authentication method being used for this connection.
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*/
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switch (port->auth_method)
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{
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case uaMD5:
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crypt_pwd = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
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if (isMD5(passwd))
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{
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if (!EncryptMD5(passwd + strlen("md5"),
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(char *) port->md5Salt,
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sizeof(port->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
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{
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pfree(crypt_pwd);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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char *crypt_pwd2 = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
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if (!EncryptMD5(passwd, port->user, strlen(port->user),
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crypt_pwd2))
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{
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pfree(crypt_pwd);
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pfree(crypt_pwd2);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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if (!EncryptMD5(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"), port->md5Salt,
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sizeof(port->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
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{
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pfree(crypt_pwd);
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pfree(crypt_pwd2);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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pfree(crypt_pwd2);
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}
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break;
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case uaCrypt:
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{
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char salt[3];
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StrNCpy(salt, port->cryptSalt, 3);
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crypt_pwd = crypt(passwd, salt);
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break;
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}
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default:
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crypt_pwd = passwd;
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break;
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}
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if (strcmp(pgpass, crypt_pwd) == 0)
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{
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/*
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* Password OK, now check to be sure we are not past valuntil
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*/
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AbsoluteTime vuntil,
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current;
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if (!valuntil || strcmp(valuntil, "\\N") == 0)
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vuntil = INVALID_ABSTIME;
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else
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vuntil = DatumGetAbsoluteTime(DirectFunctionCall1(nabstimein,
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CStringGetDatum(valuntil)));
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current = GetCurrentAbsoluteTime();
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if (vuntil != INVALID_ABSTIME && vuntil < current)
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retval = STATUS_ERROR;
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else
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retval = STATUS_OK;
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}
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pfree(passwd);
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if (valuntil)
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pfree(valuntil);
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if (port->auth_method == uaMD5)
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pfree(crypt_pwd);
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return retval;
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}
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