postgres/src/common/md5_common.c
Michael Paquier b83dcf7928 Add result size as argument of pg_cryptohash_final() for overflow checks
With its current design, a careless use of pg_cryptohash_final() could
would result in an out-of-bound write in memory as the size of the
destination buffer to store the result digest is not known to the
cryptohash internals, without the caller knowing about that.  This
commit adds a new argument to pg_cryptohash_final() to allow such sanity
checks, and implements such defenses.

The internals of SCRAM for HMAC could be tightened a bit more, but as
everything is based on SCRAM_KEY_LEN with uses particular to this code
there is no need to complicate its interface more than necessary, and
this comes back to the refactoring of HMAC in core.  Except that, this
minimizes the uses of the existing DIGEST_LENGTH variables, relying
instead on sizeof() for the result sizes.  In ossp-uuid, this also makes
the code more defensive, as it already relied on dce_uuid_t being at
least the size of a MD5 digest.

This is in philosophy similar to cfc40d3 for base64.c and aef8948 for
hex.c.

Reported-by: Ranier Vilela
Author: Michael Paquier, Ranier Vilela
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEudQAoqEGmcff3J4sTSV-R_16Monuz-UpJFbf_dnVH=APr02Q@mail.gmail.com
2021-02-15 10:18:34 +09:00

150 lines
3.4 KiB
C

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* md5_common.c
* Routines shared between all MD5 implementations used for encrypted
* passwords.
*
* Sverre H. Huseby <sverrehu@online.no>
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2021, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/common/md5_common.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef FRONTEND
#include "postgres.h"
#else
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#endif
#include "common/cryptohash.h"
#include "common/md5.h"
static void
bytesToHex(uint8 b[16], char *s)
{
static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
int q,
w;
for (q = 0, w = 0; q < 16; q++)
{
s[w++] = hex[(b[q] >> 4) & 0x0F];
s[w++] = hex[b[q] & 0x0F];
}
s[w] = '\0';
}
/*
* pg_md5_hash
*
* Calculates the MD5 sum of the bytes in a buffer.
*
* SYNOPSIS #include "md5.h"
* int pg_md5_hash(const void *buff, size_t len, char *hexsum)
*
* INPUT buff the buffer containing the bytes that you want
* the MD5 sum of.
* len number of bytes in the buffer.
*
* OUTPUT hexsum the MD5 sum as a '\0'-terminated string of
* hexadecimal digits. an MD5 sum is 16 bytes long.
* each byte is represented by two hexadecimal
* characters. you thus need to provide an array
* of 33 characters, including the trailing '\0'.
*
* RETURNS false on failure (out of memory for internal buffers
* or MD5 computation failure) or true on success.
*
* STANDARDS MD5 is described in RFC 1321.
*
* AUTHOR Sverre H. Huseby <sverrehu@online.no>
*
*/
bool
pg_md5_hash(const void *buff, size_t len, char *hexsum)
{
uint8 sum[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(PG_MD5);
if (ctx == NULL)
return false;
if (pg_cryptohash_init(ctx) < 0 ||
pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, buff, len) < 0 ||
pg_cryptohash_final(ctx, sum, sizeof(sum)) < 0)
{
pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
return false;
}
bytesToHex(sum, hexsum);
pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
return true;
}
bool
pg_md5_binary(const void *buff, size_t len, void *outbuf)
{
pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(PG_MD5);
if (ctx == NULL)
return false;
if (pg_cryptohash_init(ctx) < 0 ||
pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, buff, len) < 0 ||
pg_cryptohash_final(ctx, outbuf, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
{
pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
return false;
}
pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
return true;
}
/*
* Computes MD5 checksum of "passwd" (a null-terminated string) followed
* by "salt" (which need not be null-terminated).
*
* Output format is "md5" followed by a 32-hex-digit MD5 checksum.
* Hence, the output buffer "buf" must be at least 36 bytes long.
*
* Returns true if okay, false on error (out of memory).
*/
bool
pg_md5_encrypt(const char *passwd, const char *salt, size_t salt_len,
char *buf)
{
size_t passwd_len = strlen(passwd);
/* +1 here is just to avoid risk of unportable malloc(0) */
char *crypt_buf = malloc(passwd_len + salt_len + 1);
bool ret;
if (!crypt_buf)
return false;
/*
* Place salt at the end because it may be known by users trying to crack
* the MD5 output.
*/
memcpy(crypt_buf, passwd, passwd_len);
memcpy(crypt_buf + passwd_len, salt, salt_len);
strcpy(buf, "md5");
ret = pg_md5_hash(crypt_buf, passwd_len + salt_len, buf + 3);
free(crypt_buf);
return ret;
}